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Abstract
In contrast with the rather violent and unstable period between the collapse of the
Roman Empire and the rise of Plantagenet monarchy, the earliest phase of England’s
market  economy  coincided  with  a  remarkable  attenuation  of  brutal  interpersonal
violence. While, for some, this diminution of aggression is indicative of a ‘civilizing
process’, this paper sets out to advance our theorization of the shift from physically
violent  to  pacified  socioeconomic  competition  in  England  and  Western  Europe
between the late fourteenth century and the mid-twentieth century. In this pursuit we
draw upon the more critical  theory of the ‘pseudo-pacification process’ to explain
how physical  violence  was sublimated  and harnessed  to  drive  the  nascent  market
economy, which established and reproduced an economically productive condition of
pseudo-pacified ‘orderly disorder’.
Key  Words:  Civilizing  Process,  Pseudo-Pacification,  Orderly  Disorder,  Violence,
Market Economy.
1. Introduction
A good deal of historical evidence suggests that the earliest phases of Western liberal
capitalism  coincided  with  a  remarkable  decline  in  the  more  egregious  forms  of
interpersonal  violence.4 In contrast,  the period between the collapse of the Roman
Empire around 400 AD and the rise of the Plantagenet monarchy toward the end of
the  thirteenth  century  seems  to  have  been  rather  violent  and  destructive.  The
archaeological  record  of  the  British  Isles,  along  with  much  of  Western  Europe,
suggests a pronounced and multifaceted technological decline alongside a social order
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that relied on intimidation and privatized physical violence as the principal means of
social ordering and economic acquisition.5 By the beginning of the fourteenth century,
however, the capacity to do harm in the service of instrumental or expressive interests
was  increasingly  repressed,  initially  by  the  nascent  state,  in  ways  that  reduced
violence  in  civil  society  in  order  to  inspire  and  energize  more  economically
productive social interactions.6  
Elias7 described the dynamic force behind this  socio-historical  transformation as a
‘civilizing process’, in which human beings underwent a significant change in their
emotional  constitution as they developed sentiments  of revulsion towards violence
and  bloodshed.  For  Elias,  the  three  cornerstones  of  this  process  were  the  state’s
monopolisation  of  violence,  the  maintenance  of  social  interdependence  and  the
diffusion  of  ‘manners’,  or  civilizing  behavioural  codes.  However,  it  has  become
increasingly clear that there are a number of problems with Elias’s analysis, not least
of  which  is  his  apparent  reluctance  to  plumb  the  depths  of  political  economy.
Mucchielli8 and Wieviorka9 identify similar trends throughout Europe but frame them
in a ‘pacification process’ much more reliant on the maintenance of social institutions
external to the individual. The sustainability of pacifying social systems, they suggest,
may  depend  on  unstable  political,  socioeconomic  and  cultural  contexts  in  which
disruptive  forces  abound  including  the  ebb  and  flow  of  ‘business  cycles’,  the
distortion of social institutions and relations, and the establishment and reproduction
of  a  highly  competitive  and  individualistic  consumer  culture.  The  upshot  of  this
contextualized  critique  of  the  ‘civilizing  process’  is  that  the  decline  in  fatal  and
serious violence in the public sphere was not accompanied by a general decline in
crime10 or a general improvement in social harmony.11
5 Maddern, P. Violence and Social Order: East Anglia, 1422-1442, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992); Ward-Perkins, B. The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilisation, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005)
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7 Elias, N. The Civilizing Process, Rev. Edn. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994 [1939])
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To  explain  this  juxtaposition  we  turn  to  the  theory  of  the  ‘pseudo-pacification
process’, which allows us to reveal the interactive cultural, psychosocial and socio-
legal dynamics behind the rise of capitalism’s market economy.12 Using the historical
‘crossover’ of the declining homicide and rising property crime rates as an empirical
backdrop,  the  theory  explains  how physical  violence  was neither  ‘eliminated’  nor
‘spiritualized’ in the cultural shift away from the bodily defence of land and family
honour as Spierenburg13 claims, but repressed and sublimated to perform two vital
functions  on  behalf  of  the  nascent  market  economy.  First,  to  energize  the
sociosymbolic competition required by a burgeoning culture of consumption that was
stimulated  and  diffused  throughout  the  social  body  to  increase  market  demand.
Second,  to  evacuate  as  much  physical  violence  as  possible  from civil  society  to
protect  property  rights,  lubricate  the  nodes  and  arteries  of  trade,  legitimize
exploitative business practice by reducing the likelihood of violent retribution,  and
thus clear the way for the rise of the market.14 
In  this  article  we  will  use  this  theoretical  framework  to  further  explore  the
significance of a number of legal transformations that took place during the Middle
Ages  –  specifically,  primogeniture  and  entail,  labour  and  trading  regulations,
changing perspectives on usury and, of course, laws governing interpersonal violence
as well as other forms of criminality – to the establishment and expansion of the early
market  economy,  particularly  in  England.  We  will  first  outline  the  basic  socio-
historical  processes  that  emerged  after  the  fall  of  the  Roman  Empire,  with  an
emphasis on the remarkably consistent decline of serious interpersonal violence since
the late fourteenth century. With this empirical context in place our intention is to
push  beyond  existing  explanations  to  explore  the  ways  in  which  socio-historical
processes and ethico-legal  regulation  combine to open up a ‘third space’  between
order and disorder.15 In this third space physical violence is sufficiently pacified for a
thriving  market  economy,  but  only in  a  way that  allows for the expansion of the
11 See Wieviorka, 2009; Hall, S. Theorizing Crime and Deviance: A New Approach (London: Sage, 
2012)
12 Hall, S ‘Paths to Anelpis: Dimorphic Violence and the Pseudo-Pacification Process’ Parallax 6 
no. 2 (2000) 36-53; see also, 2007; 2012; 2014
13 Spierenburg, P, A History of Murder: Personal Violence in Europe from the Middle Ages to the 
Present (Cambridge: Polity, 2008)
14 Hall, 2014
15 ibid.
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aggressive  sociosymbolic  competition  necessary  to  boost  the  consumer  demand
required by the market.   
2. After Rome
The prominent revisionist tendency of recent decades has portrayed the end of the
Roman Empire as a gradual, relatively peaceful transition into the Renaissance rather
than an abrupt and catastrophic dissolution caused, in large part, by internal decay and
violent  invasions.16 It  has  become fashionable,  notes  Ward-Perkins17,  to  shy away
from terms such as ‘crisis’, ‘collapse’, ‘decay’ and ‘destruction’ in favour of a more
neutral  lexicon  that  describes  the  influx  of  Germanic  peoples  as  a  co-operative,
mutually beneficial settlement that played a vital role in refreshing the rather staid,
repressive cultures of the Roman world. In this version of events the ‘settlers’ adopted
the best of classical civilisation whilst bringing their own diverse and vibrant cultural
practices, ideas and beliefs to the table in such a way as to push Western Europe into
the comparative sophistication of the later Middle Ages. 
While this is undoubtedly a rather seductive narrative, it arguably suffers from a rose-
tinted revisionism that risks confining socio-historical analysis to the overly optimistic
assertion that, as Voltaire’s character Professor Pangloss said, ‘everything is for the
best  in  the  best  of  all  possible  worlds’.  In  more  practical  terms,  Ward-Perkins18
argues, this gradualist narrative of peaceful transition fails to account for empirical
data  from the archaeological  record,  which suggests crisis,  loss and a catastrophic
collapse  of  living  standards  that  affected  almost  every  aspect  of  everyday  life.
Contrary  to  late-twentieth  century  revisionism,  he  asserts,  the  dissolution  of  the
empire  plunged  large  swaths  of  Western  Europe  into  an  extended  crisis  of
governance, civility, economic productivity, technological sophistication and cultural
vibrancy, such that post-Roman Europe – the period after about 400 AD – seems to
have been a significantly less stable and developed place than it had previously been.
Drawing on a diverse body of archaeological field research, Ward-Perkins argues that
the  collapse  of  the  Roman  Empire  led  to  a  ‘disappearance  of  comfort’  from the
remains  of civil  society.  The Roman world,  he notes,  relied  upon a complex and
16 Brown,  P.  Late Antiquity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,  1998);  Bowerstock,  G.
Late Antiquity: A Guide the Post-Classical World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) 
17 Ward-Perkins, 2005
18 ibid.
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highly specialized system of skilled manufacturers producing goods to a high standard
for  a  scattered  market  of  consumers  across  the  imperial  territory.  In  effect,  high
quality goods along with people of skill and training flowed outward in the wake of
advancing conquest, constructing the nodes and arteries of long distance production
and  trading  networks,  which  included  a  supportive  infrastructure  of  boats,  roads,
exchangeable  coinage  and  wayside  hostelries.  When  these  international  networks
were  severed  by  the  ‘influx’  or  ‘invasion’  of  external  populations,  local
infrastructures, particularly at the periphery, seem to have failed to pick up the slack
such that:
[T]he post-Roman world reverted to levels of economic simplicity, lower even
than those of immediately pre-Roman times, with little movement of goods, poor
housing, and only the most basic manufactured items.19
In other words, it seems as though the benefits of long-distance trade and access to
foreign ‘experts’ supplanted local skills and knowledge during the empire’s outward
march,  but,  when  access  to  these  networks  was  cut  off,  local  systems  could  not
maintain standards,  and thus fell  back to pre-Roman levels  of cultural,  social  and
technological  sophistication.  Throughout  his  work  Ward-Perkins  refers  to  a  great
many  practical  illustrations  of  a  general  deterioration  following  the  collapse  of
imperial  power,  including  the  loss  of  productive  capacity  at  the  level  of  food
production,  shrinking and more divided, hostile and isolated populations, a loss of
scale  and  complexity  in  the  built  environment  and,  perhaps  most  tellingly,  a
retrenchment of literacy and education, all of which seem to have fallen into a steep
decline and stayed at a substantially reduced level for a number of centuries.
When taken as a whole, Ward-Perkins argues, the multifaceted decline of the post-
Roman world can be legitimately described as the ‘end of civilization’ in the territory,
by which he means an extraordinary loss of complexity and sophistication, economic
production,  socio-political  interaction  and  cultural  output.20 This  degeneration,  he
adds, is captured most clearly in the archaeological record, much of which paints a
picture of a society reeling from a traumatic change of circumstances. In the wake of
the collapse, high-quality mass-produced goods all but disappeared from everyday life
19 ibid. 137
20 see also  Turner,  J.  A.  The Collapse of  Complex  Societies,  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University
Press, 1988) 
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and, in some of the outer provinces, including the British Isles, there seems to have
been a remarkable decline in general literacy as common written records – graffiti –
all  but  disappeared.  Furthermore,  until  the  Norman  building  programme  of  the
eleventh century, there also seems to have been an almost complete lack of large-scale
stone building on the order of Hadrian’s Wall not to mention the decline of ceramic
tile production, which led to a decrease in cleanliness and an increase in diseases. 
For our purposes, however, by far the most significant aspect of this socio-cultural
deterioration is the explosion of everyday physical violence that appears to have taken
place within the space evacuated by Roman imperial power. The empire enjoyed a
moderate degree of success when it came to reducing the prevalence of interpersonal
violence in everyday life. Success was achieved partly by sublimating and redirecting
violence into armed conquest of land occupied by external ‘others’, sociosymbolic
competition, thoroughgoing behavioural codes, relatively fluid and competitive class
structuring and burgeoning blood sports but also as a result of combining political
complexity with a modicum of political stability in the Pax Romana system. However,
the same most definitely cannot be said for Dark Age and early Middle Age societies
across Europe. 
While it is always rather difficult  to clearly identify specific features of individual
lives at such a remove from the original events, it seems as though one of the most
notable  features  of  post-Roman  society  was  an  explosion  of  physical  brutality  in
everyday life and its establishment as a foundation for social relations.21 The extent to
which the collapse of the empire and its networks of social,  political,  cultural  and
economic  interdependencies  opened  up  a  power  vacuum  that  allowed  physical
violence to bleed back into everyday life is, of course, hotly debated. Even if we leave
the headline events – the Viking raids of the eighth century and the Norman Conquest
of 1066 – to one side, however, there is a great deal of evidence which suggests that
the European societies of the thousand years or so following 400AD had to contend
with  deeply  problematic,  socially  destructive,  culturally  degenerative  and
economically  dysfunctional  levels  of  savagery  and  instrumental  violence.  In  his
21 Halsall,  G.  ‘Violence  and  Society  in  the  Early  Medieval  West:  An  Introductory  Survey’  in
Violence and Society in the Late Medieval West,  edited by Guy Halsall (Woodbridge: Boydell &
Brewer, 1992), 1-45; see also Maddern, 1992
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discussion of early English history and criminal law, for example, Hibbert22 points to
a number of attempts to establish monetary compensation as an alternative to blood
feuds and tit-for-tat  cycles of interpersonal  violence,  but notes that any such legal
system was hampered by the difficulties of exercising legitimate administrative power
over large geographical areas. Even the brutal governance of the Norman invaders
failed, he notes, to restore anything that could be called a system of law and order,
and this  failure occurred despite  shifting penalties  significantly  in the direction  of
bodily mutilation. 
Marauding gangs of brigands, Hibbert23 suggests, operated with absolute impunity,
often seizing control of whole towns and large areas of the countryside for years at a
time, or, in one particularly spectacular escapade, managing to break into the Royal
Treasury at Westminster and make off with a sizeable portion of its content. This kind
of gang rule resulted in a profusion of mini-kleptocracies in which violence, although
it may have been used to establish and maintain power and domination, was fixated
on  practical  economic  concerns  such  as  securing  the  proceeds  of  the  import  and
export  trade,  confiscating  and counterfeiting  money,  and kidnapping travellers  for
hefty  ransoms.  These  acquisitive  practices  were  reinforced  by  a  conspicuous
propensity for violence and torture. Even after Edward I’s reorganisation of the justice
and control system in the late thirteenth century, in northern areas at a greater distance
from seats of power this sort of constant threat persisted into the sixteenth century.
The Border Reivers, for instance, were a fickle alliance of violent familial clans from
the  Anglo-Scottish  borderlands  with  little  interest  in  politics,  agriculture  or  craft
production but disposed to prey on local populations and extract tithes on threat of
violence  from  those  involved  in  agricultural  production  and  commercial  transit
between the two fledgling nations.24 
Accordingly, the violence of early medieval life, we might suggest, reflects nothing so
much as minimal respect for law and the absence of centralized authority with the
capacity to ensure compliance. What operated in their place was a set of autonomous
localized cultural codes that placed great emphasis on violence as a principal means
22 Hibbert,  C.  The  Roots  of  Evil:  A  Social  History  of  Crime  and  Punishment,  (Stroud:  Sutton
Pubishing, 2003 [1963])
23ibid.
24 Fraser,  G.  The  Steel  Bonnets:  The  Story  of  the  Anglo-Scottish  Border  Reivers  (London:
HarperCollins, 2012)
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of dispute settlement and economic acquisition. Just as technological sophistication,
economic production and cultural  vibrancy fell  back to something resembling pre-
Roman forms, so did the social structures and norms that had succeeded in reducing
everyday violence. Consequently, social relations during the Dark and early-Middle
Ages also came to resemble those of a darker, prehistoric human past.25
In the aftermath of the Roman Empire’s precipitous collapse, and for the better part of
a millennium afterwards, myriad forms of brutal physical violence blighted European
populations.  Anyone  wishing  to  travel  between  growing  towns  and  cities  had  to
contend with “brigands who continued to plague open highways, the private noble
wars which ravaged the countryside, or even the pirates who corrupted the nearby
sea”.26 What’s more, it seems likely that there was often a palpable sense of fear and
insecurity even within the comparative safety of town walls. Early Medieval streets
seem to have been places of quotidian dispute settlement that frequently descended
into “brawls, beatings with fists and knives, and vengeful attacks”.27 
While it is almost impossible to put reliable figures on the prevalence of interpersonal
violence in the distant past, there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that the surface
relief of post-Roman society was frequently and visibly affected by physical conflict.
It is not the case that this was a millennium of constant militarized infighting and
attack from without. There were undoubtedly periods of relative calm, but, equally,
the threat of everyday violence never seems to have been far below the surface. The
social order of the Vikings, for example, appears to have been built around a ‘spiral of
violence’ based on the power afforded by heritable property and the various clans’
attempts  to  acquire  as  much  as  possible,  which  resulted  in  cycles  of  feuds  and
reprisals.28 When the Normans invaded Britain some parts seem to have capitulated
relatively quickly, but in the north rival groups entered into a long-running and bitter
struggle for Northumbrian sovereignty, in which the introduction of a new power bloc
25 Armit, I. ‘Violence and Society in the Deep Human Past’, British Journal of Criminology, 51 no. 3
(2011)  499-517;  Nivette,  A.  ‘Violence  in  Non-State  Societies:  A  Review’  British  Journal  of
Criminology, 51 no. 3 (2011) 578-598
26 Skoda, S.  Medieval Violence: Physical Brutality in Northern France, 1270-1330  (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 51
27 ibid. 50
28 Morris, G. ‘Violence and Late Viking Social Order’ in Violence and Society in the Late Medieval
West, edited by Guy Halsall (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 1992) 141-156
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led only to  further  conflict.  In  Speight’s29 terms,  “many of the assassinations  and
massacres that litter the region’s history can be attributed to the imposition of non-
customary dues and practices” even to the extent that the rebel factions invited in and
sided with an invading Danish army. It took the infamous ‘Harrying of the North’ –
the decision made in 1070 by William the Conqueror to burn northern settlements,
destroy crops and generally pillage the area – for the Norman powers to gain any
measure of control. Even with their lordship established and the rebel forces beaten
into  submission,  however,  Norman  governance  often  proved  quite  spectacularly
ineffectual. In the course of the next two or three centuries, for example, they were
forced, time and again, to announce new measures meant to combat brigandage and
reduce the prevalence of marauding gangs of armed bandits, none of which seem to
have enjoyed much success.30  
With the above in mind we can risk the assertion that Dark Age and early Medieval
England seems to have been a relatively violent place. Yet this only leaves us with the
obvious  question surrounding the  purpose and function  of  overt  violence  in  post-
Roman society. Cowell31 suggests that the upper end of feudal society was based on
two conjoined principles of ‘gift giving’ and ‘violent taking’. The purpose of both
seems to have been to establish a degree of reciprocity within the aristocracy and,
more broadly, the chivalric class of warriors on whom the former based their power.
Gifts necessarily came laden with a debt accrued from the act of acceptance, such that
interrelations of reciprocity and obligation could be replicated without resort to the
interference of centralized authority.32 In much the same way, an act of violence – a
raid, an ambush, a declaration of private war – came laden with a return game, an act
of vengeance that further served to enshrine reciprocity within the aristocracy whilst
simultaneously allowing them to parasitize the lower orders by extracting protection
money/resources in the form of tribute. The capacity to deploy violence or to have
others do so at individual behest, in other words, was a key aspect of social relations
29 Speight, S. ‘Violence and the Creation of Socio-Political Order in Post Conquest Yorkshire’  in
Violence and Society in the Late Medieval West,  edited by Guy Halsall (Woodbridge: Boydell &
Brewer, 1992) 157-174
30 see Halsall, 1992; Hibbert, 2003
31 Cowell,  A.  The  Medieval  Warrior  Aristocracy:  Gifts,  Violence,  Performance  and  the  Sacred,
(Woodbridge: D S Brewer, 2007)
32 ibid.
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within  feudal  society  even  to  the  extent,  as  Eisner33 observes,  that  it  determined
exactly who held kingship across Europe. 
With closer attention to the less powerful classes in the European social order, Skoda
makes a similar point in relation to street violence, which seems to have functioned as
a basic form of social ordering that allowed for the generation and maintenance of:
…self-image and one’s place within the community… [and] notions of honour
street violence protected the ‘psychic property’ of the individual, his or her sense
of self and place within social networks.34 
In other words, if individuals were to hold onto property, maintain a sense of honour
and prevent themselves from being cheated and dispossessed by their neighbours, a
propensity  for  physical  violence  seems  to  have  been  a  necessary  and  a  socially
legitimate requirement. At just about every level of the social order violence appears
to have functioned, in the absence of a centralized authority, as a primary means of
acquiring and preserving security, wealth and status through the bodily defence of
land, property and honour. It is this underlying principle, more than any other, which
characterizes the basal structure of the feudal order to the extent that Sharpe35 is able
to point to a society built on the violence of ‘hard men’ “accustomed to fighting as a
normal part of life”.
If we take all of the above at face value it is entirely likely that the dark shadow of
post-Roman Britain, particularly the early part of the Middle Ages, provided at least
some of  the impetus  for  Thomas Hobbes’s36 idea of  a pre-social  ‘state  of  nature’
lacking  any  sort  of  inherent  inclination  to  pacification  and  plagued  by  both
exploitative and defensive brutality.  Violence, he argued, was used to gain control
over the lives of other people and their property, used in the defence of honour and
property, and often arose at the slightest provocation or perception of threat. In other
words, Hobbes seems to be harking back to the type of society we have described thus
far – a society in which, as Gurr puts it: 
33 Eisner,  M.  ‘Killing  Kings:  Patterns  of  Regicide  in  Europe,  AD  600-1800’  British  Journal  of
Criminology 51 no. 3 (2011) 556-577
34 Skoda, 2013: 56
35 Sharpe, 1996: 18
36 Hobbes, T. Leviathan, (Oxford: Oxford World Classics, 2008 [1651])
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[M]en  were  easily  provoked  to  violent  anger,  and  were  unrestrained  in  the
brutality with which they attacked their opponents. Interpersonal violence was a
recurring fact of rural and urban life.37
While the early estimates on which these initial observations are based are inevitably
rather imprecise, the improved record-keeping practices of the later Middle Ages in
Europe, and, in England from the beginning of the Tudor period, allow for a clearer
understanding of historical rates and trends of violence. The increased availability of
empirical data in the form of written records has allowed a number of scholars38 to
observe  relatively  high  levels  of  interpersonal  violence  into  the  fourteenth  and
fifteenth centuries, followed by a long-term decline up to the middle decades of the
twentieth century. Eisner39 identifies the middle decades of the fourteenth century as a
high point for the level of overt violence in English life, after which murder rates and,
by implication,  lesser  forms of  violence  began to  drop off.  Something significant
seems to have changed during the middle part of the fourteenth century that initiated
an  extended  process  in  which  overt  everyday  violence  was  eventually  all  but
extinguished from English public  life,  certainly  for  the majority  who managed to
avoid locales of acute marginalisation.40 
3. Civilization or Pseudo-Pacification?
In many cases  accounts  of  the long-term decline  of  physical  violence  in  Western
Europe rely quite heavily on Norbert Elias’s41 concept of a ‘civilizing process’, even
to the extent,  as Mares42 notes, that there seems to be a broad agreement that this
37 Gurr, T. ‘Historical Trends in Violent Crime: A Critical Review of the Evidence’ in  Crime and
Justice 3,  edited by Michael Tonry & Norval Morris (Chicago, MA: University of Chicago Press,
1981) 307
38 see,  for instance, Gurr,  ibid.;  Gurr,  T.  ‘Historical  Trends in Violence Crime: Europe and the
United States’ in Violence in America, Vol. 1: The History of Crime, edited by Ted Gurr, (Thousand
Oaks,  CA:  Sage);  Eisner,  M.  ‘Modernisation,  Self  Control  and  Lethal  Violence:  Long-Term
Dynamics of European Homicide Rates in Theoretical Perspective’ British Journal of Criminology,
41 no. 4 (2001) 618-638; Eisner, M. ‘Secular Trends in Violent Crime: Evidence and Theoretical
Interpretations’,  Crime & Justice: An Annual Review, 31 (2003) 83-142; Spierenburg, P. ‘Faces of
Violence:  Homicide Trends and Cultural  Meanings:  Amsterdam,  1431-1816’,  Journal  of  Social
History 27 no. 4 (1994) 701-17; Spierenburg, 2008
39 see Eisner, 2001
40 see Taylor,  I  Crime in Context: A Critical Criminology of Market Societies (Cambirdge: Polity,
1999); Hall, S., Winlow, S. & Ancrum, C. Criminal Identities and Consumer Culture: Crime, Exclusion
and the New Culture of Narcissism, (Cullompton: Willan, 2008); Winlow, S & Hall, S.  Rethinking
Social Exclusion (London: Sage, 2013)
41 Elias, 1994 [1939]
42 Mares,  D.  ‘Civilization, Economic Change,  and Trends in Interpersonal Violence in Western
Societies’, Theoretical Criminology 13 no. 4 (2009) 419-449
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aging work provides us with the most insightful narrative yet available. While a full
discussion of the fine details of Elias’s thesis is well beyond the scope of a single
article  it  is  perhaps  best  that  we  at  least  re-familiarize  ourselves  with  its  basic
premises. 
In the long transition from the Middle Ages to early ‘modernity’ a series of complex
and interlocking psychosocial transformations supposedly led, all but inexorably, to
the minimisation of interpersonal violence across Western Europe. The ‘civilization’
of  English  society,  for  instance,  Elias  argued,  relied  substantially  on  the  growing
power  and  dominance  of  the  Plantagenet  monarchy  during  the  thirteenth  and
fourteenth  centuries,  especially  their  ability  to  monopolize  the means  of  violence.
This centralisation and monopolisation of the legal capacity of monarchical states to
do  harm  allowed  them  to  secure  increasingly  pacified  social  interaction  across
progressively larger portions of their territories, which facilitated a general upturn in
commerce, trade and, crucially, taxable income. The interest shown by elites allowed
for the growth and maintenance of structural complexity in the form of bureaucratic
regulation – particularly legal codes – and the kind of broad-based socio-economic
interdependencies last seen during the heyday of the Roman Empire. At this point,
Elias suggests, the process effectively assumed a life of its own as the move away
from  the  anxious,  defensive  and  often  self-aggrandizing  deployment  of  violence
began, over a number of generations, to change the way that people thought, felt and
interacted such that  the population at  large lost  any direct  acquaintance with their
capacity  for  violence,  which  became  repressed  and  subsumed  beneath  culturally
maintained and reproduced behavioural codes. Beginning in the courtly upper reaches
of the social structure, Elias held, these codes diffused outwards throughout everyday
culture  to  be  psychologically  internalized  and  reproduced.  The  abandonment  of
everyday hostility  and physical violence allowed the development  of ‘figurational’
networks of interdependencies between individuals acting in the various nodes and
arteries of socioeconomic life.  
While these ideas undoubtedly go some way towards explaining the historical decline
of  overt  violence  in  Western  European  society,  however,  there  are  a  number  of
significant  problems  at  the  heart  of  the  thesis.  They  congregate  around  the
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assumptions  of  naturalism,  teleological  evolutionism,  internal  cohesion  and  the
vaguely transcendental nature of ‘interdependencies’. In Elias’s terms:
The  individual  is  compelled  to  regulate  his  conduct  in  an  increasingly
differentiated,  more  even  and  more  stable  manner…  characteristic  of  the
psychological changes in the course of civilization: the more complex and stable
control of conduct is increasingly instilled in the individual… a self-compulsion
that he cannot resist even if he consciously wishes to. The web of actions grows
so complex and extensive,  the  effort  required to  behave ‘correctly’  within  it
becomes  so  great,  that  beside  the  individual’s  conscious  self-control  an
automatic, blindly functioning apparatus of self-control is firmly established.43 
In  other  words,  the  core  of  Elias’s  thesis  relies  on  a  repeated  assertion  that
interdependence between people and communities necessarily and all but inevitably
fosters civilized, physically non-violent sensibilities in a way that reflects a sort of
‘blind’ and ‘evolutionary’ dynamic drive toward increasingly pacified forms of social
interaction.  Within  the confines  of his  work it  is  almost  as if  the development  of
social,  cultural,  economic and political  complexities,  along with the inter-relations
they entail,  lead  inexorably  to  the  development,  maintenance  and reproduction  of
‘civilized’  behavioural  codes.  What  this  does,  however,  is  to  gloss  over  the
relationship between internal and external worlds in a way that largely fails to provide
a  clear  and  convincing  explanation  for  how we  might  get  from what  Elias  calls
‘sociogenesis’ – the generation and proliferation of objective social conditions and
relations – to the subjective internalisation entailed by ‘psychogenesis’. In positing
such  a  blind  drive  toward  ‘civilization’,  Elias  provides  a  teleological  account  of
pacification,  which  mistakes  effect  for  drive,  and,  as  a  result,  overstates  and  yet
oversimplifies one of the defining features of the long run of European history. 
If we consider such a linear teleological thesis in light of the general continuation – if
not outright escalation44 – of brutality in European systems of punishment, along with
the central role played by exploitation and primitive accumulation within economic
systems  steadily  moving  in  the  general  direction  of  the  industrial  revolution,  the
connection  between social  interdependence  and pacification  might  not be quite  as
43 Elias, 1994: 445-446
44 Gatrell, V. The Hanging Tree: Execution and the English People, 1770-1868, New Edn, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996) 
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‘stable’  or  dependable  as  the  original  work  would  tend  to  suggest.45 Indeed,
throughout history, the artistic, philosophical and technological apexes of civilisations
have been closely associated with various forms of violence and exploitation. In much
the same way, the centralisation of the capacity for ‘legitimate’ violence in the hands
of the state was never quite as effective, legitimate or neutral as Elias posits. The late
Medieval  and Tudor monarchical  states,  just  like more contemporary  examples  of
technocratic stewardship in relation to global markets,46 often engaged in brutality in
order  to fulfil  predatory political  and economic  aspirations  largely  immaterial  and
indeed sometimes damaging to the everyday lives of subject populations.   
Furthermore,  this  attribution  of  neutrality,  along  with  the  underlying  naturalist
emphasis, points us to the deepest problems in Elias’s thesis; two ontological flaws
deprive the inhabitants of modernism’s relatively pacified social  order of a certain
amount  of  their  subjectivity.  First,  it  is  far  too  easy  to  explain  away  a  major
behavioural  trend  such  as  pacification  by  psychologising  and  naturalising  it,  and
positing it as an inexhaustible teleological drive in the movement of history. What this
does  is  to  deprive  social  action  of  dialecticism,  of  the  push  and  pull  between
individuals  and their  context.  Second, the suggestion that ‘civilisation’  might  be a
natural  corollary  of  growing  interdependencies  is  to  fall  into  the  trap  of  over-
socialising the concept of pacification by associating it with factors all but entirely
external to the actor’s consciousness. The formulation that growing interdependence
between individuals  and communities  maintained by the centralising  power of the
state provided a fertile seedbed for the proliferation of emotional empathy, which,
over decades and centuries, coalesced into a natural psychosocial aversion to violence
and bloodshed is just too neat. It largely ignores the vagaries and contingencies of
thinking subjects trying to make their way through life as best they can, particularly in
terms  of  their  fears  and passions,  desires  and frustrations.  Equally,  it  ignores  the
instability  and often hostile  competitiveness  that  characterized the capitalist  socio-
economic  environment  that  was  supposed  to  act  as  the  foundation  for  the
psychogenesis of pacified sensibilities.47 
45 Hall, 2014
46 Rancière, J. Hatred of Democracy, (London: Verso,  2006); Galbraith, J. The Predator State: How 
Conservatives Abandoned the Free Market and Why Liberals Should Too, (New York, NY: The Free 
Press, 2008)
47 Hall, 2000; 2007
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If Elias’s schema is to be taken at face value, his assertion of growing empathy within
and  between  populations  must  also  contend  with  a  less  commonly  discussed  but
equally important counter-trend – the observation that ‘crime’ in the broad sense of
interpersonal violation seems not to have declined in a ‘civilized’ context so much as
mutated and changed with the times. It is in this context, for instance, that Sharpe48
points  to  “a  shift  from  ‘feudal’  criminality  based  on  violence…  to  a  ‘modern’
criminality  based  on  property  offences”  between  the  late  Middle  Ages  and  the
nineteenth  century.  Inevitably,  this  suggestion  is  rather  difficult  to  substantiate.
Nevertheless, amongst historians of crime there seems to be a general acceptance that
the  processes  which  reduced  the  level  of  overt  violence  in  the  public  spaces  of
European life seem to have been matched by a proliferation of non-violent, abstract
forms of criminality appearing throughout the social structure.49 
This  insight  allows  us  to  begin  moving beyond the  naturalistic  bounds  of  Elias’s
thesis toward a more nuanced analysis of historical change in the combined fields of
political  economy and psychosocial pacification.  If we acknowledge that the long-
term decline in everyday physical violence coincided with the emergence of urban,
industrial, commercial and, ultimately, capitalist societies then we must also note that
the  accompanying  process  of  marketization  provided  fertile  ground  for  the
development of sensibilities, values and meanings conducive to and called forth by
the new political economy.50 
In light  of the likely empirical  crossover between violent  and abstract  criminality,
however, a number of current theorists, particularly Michel Wieviorka51 and Laurent
Mucchielli52, have begun to move away from Elias’s rather Whiggish and teleological
‘civilizing  process’  toward  the  essential  task  of  locating  pacified  emotional
dispositions within a properly dynamic and interactive understanding of contemporary
political  economy. That  is to say, within the interplay between grand scale socio-
historical transformations and the ways in which they structure and mould everyday
48 Sharpe, 1996: 20; see also Hibbert, 2003 [1963]
49 ibid.; Sharpe, J. A. ‘Crime, Order & Historical Change’, in The Problem of Crime, 2nd Edn, edited
by John Muncie & Eugene McLaughlin (London: Sage,  2001);  Wilson,  C.  A Criminal History of
Mankind, New Edn, (London: Mercury, 2005); Hall, 2012
50 Hall, 2007
51 Wieviorka, 2009
52 Mucchielli, 2010
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life as the material and symbolic foundations for aspirations, beliefs, desires, norms,
values and all manner of sensibilities.       
What this means, however, is that the physical violence employed as a social ordering
technique throughout the social structure of early Europe did not decline because the
prevailing  values  and  sensibilities  of  the  age  became  more  orientated  towards
pacification. It came instead from a dualistic and mutually reinforcing economic need
within  emerging  market  economies.  Market  economies  cannot  expand  in
socioeconomic systems structured and driven by either physical violence or altruism.53
The expansion of the production and circulation of commodities  depended on the
contemporary  state’s  ability  to  protect  property  rights  and  economic  activity  by
reducing  violence  across  sufficiently  large  geographical  areas.  This  was  largely
achieved  through  systematic  shifts  in  law  and  cultural  values  that  repressed  and
privatized  altruism,  but  simultaneously  repressed  and  sublimated  the  destructive
violence that would normally increase in a non-altruistic culture into a symbolically
aggressive yet physically pacified competition for the symbols of wealth and status in
Europe’s emergent consumer culture.54 
In other words, pacification was – before individuals became accustomed to its codes
and  internalized  its  sensibilities  –  initially  a  functional  by-product  of  political-
economic change, specifically the development of early market economies and their
basic  requirement  to  repress  physical  violence  and  simultaneously  encourage  the
individual’s  interest  and  participation  in  pacified  rule-bound  sociosymbolic
competition and economic exploitation; to encourage functional aggression yet, at the
same time, to keep a lid on the situation and prevent either pre-emptive or reactive
violence becoming physical by expanding systems of governance and control. In other
words,  pacification  emerged  as  a  functional  practice  before  it  became  culturally
established and psychologically internalized. Contra Foucault,55 control of the body’s
passions – ‘biopower’ or ‘biopolitics’ – seems to have been predominantly focused on
violent and altruistic interactions rather than political and sexual sentiments.56  
53 Hall, 2014
54 Hall, 2012
55 Foucault,  M.  The History of Sexuality,  Volume 1: The Will  to Knowledge,  New Edn, (London:
Penguin, 1998); Foucault, M.  The Order of Things: Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London:
Routledge, 2001); Foucault, M. The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 2002)
56 Hall, 2012; 2014
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In this way, the theory of the pseudo-pacification process opens up the possibility of
more  rewarding  explanations  for  the  long  term  decline  of  physical  violence  in
Western  Europe.  It  is  rooted  in  material  political  economy  rather  than  Elias’s57
woolly,  evolutionary  orientation  towards  civic  peace  on  the  basis  of  increasingly
refined empathic sensibilities,  or Foucault’s58 shifts in discursive and classificatory
schema and normalized subjectivity that occur for no discernible reason other than
‘discipline’. ‘Discipline’, ‘classification’ and ‘discursive production’ are simply the
means of shaping and controlling a potent pre-existing libidinal drive that at its root is
located  in  a  rule-bound  system  of  stimulation  and  pacification  and  activated  by
increased  social  anxiety,  individual  freedom  from  social  obligations,  and  the
commercialisation of consumer desires.59 
The  concept  of  ‘pseudo-pacification’  locates  the  decline  of  interpersonal  violence
specifically within the unstable and indeterminate context of market economies in a
dynamic  relationship  with  social  and  individual  subjectivity.  The  sociological
implications  of  this  suite  of  concepts  have  been  dealt  with  in  an  embryonic  but
growing criminological and sociological literature that is largely beyond the remit of
this piece.60 What we want to do here is to take these insights in a slightly different
direction  by  using  them  as  a  starting  point  for  a  socio-historical  analysis  of  the
development of important aspects of the English legal system. It is to this end that we
now turn our attention. 
4. The Third Space of Orderly Disorder
The process of repairing England’s social  order after the depredations of the Dark
Ages and early Middle Ages – most notably the disruption and violent aftermath of
the Norman invasion – began with the coronation of Edward I in 1274. Upon his
accession  he  immediately  began  a  far-reaching  programme  of  legal  reform  that
eventually  replaced  Feudal  power  with  something  a  little  closer  to  modern
57 Elias, 1994 [1939]
58 Foucault, M. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Penguin, 1991)
59 Hall, 2012; 2014
60 Moxon,  D.  ‘Consumer  Culture  and  the  2011  ‘Riots’,  Sociological  Research  Online,  16  no.  4
(2011);  Briggs,  D.  Deviance  and  Risk  on  Holiday (Basingstoke:  Palgrave  MacMillan,  2013);
Winlow, S. ‘Trauma, Guilt and the Unconscious’ in Violence and Society: Toward a New Sociology,
edited by, J. Kilby & L. Ray, (Oxford: Wiley/Blackwell, 2014); Horsley, M. ‘The ‘Death of Deviance’
and the Stagnation of Twentieth Century Criminology’, in The Death and Resurrection of Deviance,
edited by M. Dellwing, J. Kotarba & N. Pino (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan); Horsley, M. The
Dark Side of Prosperity: Late Capitalism’s Culture of Indebtedness, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015)
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governance.61 In the first few decades of his reign, spurred by recognition that the
prevailing  incidence  of  interpersonal  and  group  violence  as  a  structural  ordering
technique could not remain unchecked, he set about codifying and adding weight of
statute  to  a  host  of  pre-existing  customs in ways that  were meant  to enhance the
enforcement of pacification. If we were looking for a legal cornerstone of modernity’s
embryonic social order we could do much worse than the 1283 Statute of Winchester,
which attempted, under a system of reticular command and delegation, to refurbish
and  revitalize  traditional  practices  of  mutual  responsibility  for  the  detection  and
prosecution of crimes committed within defined geographical areas. 
What  this  involved  was,  initially,  a  set  of  provisions  that  strengthened  the
longstanding  requirement  that  all  men should have  access  to  some description  of
weapon, the exact  nature of which depended on social  rank – knights were to be
availed of swords, armour and horses, commoners bows and arrows – supplemented
by  an  administrative  caste  of  ‘royal  officers’  empowered  to  carry  out  public
inspection.62 With these arms, local watches were to be kept and, in the event of an
offence,  the bulk of the able-bodied male population were expected to turn out in
pursuit of suspects. Furthermore, town gates were to be closed during the hours of
darkness and no strangers permitted entry, thereby effectively subjecting any sizeable
settlement to an after-dark curfew. The new system engaged in renewed attempts to
humanize and pacify the English countryside by limiting brigands’ capacity to ply
their trade and stipulating that hedges be coppiced for 200 feet on either side of public
highways to reduce the possibility of ambush, in what resembles a thirteenth century
form of situational crime prevention.63 In addition, it also specified what was to be
done if these practices failed to prevent or convict, such that “the victims of robbery
would henceforward be able to claim restitution from the hundreds [a contemporary
administrative unit of population] in which they fell among thieves”.64  
In this fashion large parts of the legal system that were established in the wake of
Edward’s reign seem to have adopted a similarly distributivist emphasis in an attempt
to  reinstate  a  modicum  of  altruism  and  social  justice  in  everyday  life,  but  were
61 Hibbert, 2003 [1963]
62 Summerson, H. ‘The Enforcement of the Statute of Winchester, 1285-1327’ Journal of Legal 
History, 13 no. 3 (1992) 232-250
63 Walsh, D. ‘The Obsolescence of Crime Forms’ Crime Prevention Studies 2 (1994) 149-163
64 Summerson, 1992: 232
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organized more by  reactive legal practices than  proactive cultural values. With the
usual caveats around attributing specific thoughts to the inhabitants of the distant past,
the early English state seems to have hit upon the idea that pacification relied on the
legal system’s capacity to reproduce as reactive practices at least some degree of the
practical  mutuality  that  had  existed  before.  What  the  tradition  amounted  to  was
simply  a  series  of  mutually  reinforcing  statutory  provisions  and  customary
assumptions – including restrictions on trading activities, the prohibition of usury and
limitations on both minimum and maximum wages to ensure ‘sufficient livelihood’ –
that set about both limiting individuals’ capacity to exploit and prey upon each other
whilst ensuring a reasonably fair distribution of economic participation and reward
from such abstinence.65 If we take contemporary usury legislation, for instance, the
church-led rejection of ‘lending for increase’ – charging interest – was based largely
on the assumption that it  was a distinctly  predatory craft,  which amounted to “an
immoral means of gaining something from nothing… [making] money from money
without labour or service and at the expense of the poor and needy”.66 
By way of contrast, medieval regulation of wages and livelihood seems to have tried
to increase pecuniary rewards for even the lowest forms of labour such that wages
appear to have doubled between 1340 and 1400.67 While it would be negligent not to
acknowledge that  at  least  some of  this  comparative  generosity  can be traced to  a
reduced labour supply after the first wave of bubonic plague this, as Dyer also notes,
does not tell the whole story as there had already been movements in this direction
prior  to  the  epidemic.  What  this  regulatory  system  produced,  however,  was  a
diffusion and democratisation of legally-sanctioned control,  which set  in motion a
gradual diminution of everyday violence, repressed by diffuse social pressure that saw
as its reward the material benefits accruing from the pacification and artificial reactive
altruism that facilitated the booming pre-capitalist distributivist economy of the late
fourteenth century.68 In this way, the origins of the pseudo-pacification process, contra
65 Hall, S. & Winlow, S Revitalizing Criminological Theory: Toward a New Ultra-Realism, (London:
Routledge, 2015) 
66 Davis, J.  Medieval Market Morality: Life, Law & Ethics in the English Marketplace, 1200-1500,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 65; see also, Graeber, D.  Debt: The First 5,000
Years, (New York, NY: Melville House, 2011)
67 Dyer,  C.  Everyday Life in Medieval England,  London: The Hambledon Press,  1994); see also,
Dyer, C. Standards of Living in the Later Middle Ages: Social Change in England c. 1200-1520, Rev.
Edn., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)
68 see Hall, 2014
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Durkheim,69 betray the roots of social order within the enculturation of legal codes
rather than the legalisation of cultural codes. 
With the cautiously administered delegation of crime control  to the citizenry,  late
medieval  social  regulation  paved  the  way  for  more  effective  responses  to  the
problems of banditry and brigandage that plagued English society in the decades prior
to  the  reign  of  Edward I.  While  these  systems  inevitably  elicit  the  usual  caveats
around their ultimate effectiveness,70 they at least went some way to formalising crime
control  and expanding  the  reach  of  the  criminal  justice  system such that  we can
reasonably  talk  about  a  significantly  safer  territory  with  increased  scope  for
production and trade. In conditions of greater security, the more enterprising sections
of the general population were able to capitalize on the increased viability of inter-
urban trade to begin establishing the sort of sophisticated trading networks that rely
on the capacity to move goods, money and people through the developing nodes and
arteries of a nascent market system. The pacification of society in other words took
place within, around and even as a corollary of a process of commercialisation that
itself  relied on concomitant and complimentary practices of sovereignty,  discipline
and  control  as  well  as  the  everyday  beliefs  and  aspirations  of  an  already  quite
individualistic,  profit-minded  and  increasingly  pacified  yet  rather  symbolically
aggressive entrepreneurial  population.71  It is quite likely that at this point we can
detect the beginning of the rise of what Priestland72 calls the ‘merchant caste’ to a
position of prominence amongst the ruling elite as it displaced the ‘soldier’ and ‘sage’
castes  which  administered  the  reproduction  of,  respectively,  organized  physical
violence and cultural codes and values.
However, the integral pseudo-pacification associated with the development of market
economies was not reliant on the total displacement of values by legal codes. It was
also fuelled, at least in part, by selected pre-existing practices and beliefs within the
general population. Socio-legal codification of evolving and diffusing customs that
revolved around commerce and entrepreneurship – which increased markedly from
69 Durkheim, E. The Division of Labour in Society, (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1997 [1893])
70 Hibbert, 2003 [1963]
71 Macfarlane, A. The Origins of English Individualism: The Family, Property and Social Transition,
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979); see also Hall, 2012   
72 Priestland, D. Merchant, Soldier, Sage: A New History of Power, (London: Allen Lane, 2012)
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the tenth century as new trade routes were opened up73 – permitted, compelled and
inspired people to internalize and embody such ideas to an even greater extent. If we
turn  our  attention  to,  for  example,  Dyer’s74 work  on  everyday  life  in  Medieval
England  it  is  immediately  apparent  that  the  nation  already  contained  a  growing
number  of  labourers,  merchants  and  skilled  tradesmen  accustomed  to  an
individualistic,  enterprising,  ‘go-getting’  lifestyle  within local  communities.  In  the
course of the twelfth through fifteenth centuries, however, the increased viability of
inter-urban  trade,  along  with  other  complementary  additions  to  the  English  legal
system, allowed what had been quite disparate and disconnected interests to become
something  much  closer  to  a  proto-bourgeoisie  in  terms  of  the  ambitious,
individualistic beliefs and understandings they held about themselves and the world
around them.75 
It is unlikely that Norman traditions as a whole were entirely alien to the inhabitants
of post-Roman England, but there are significant differences between these customs
and those favoured by the Plantagenet  reform programmes.  The Feudal  system in
place prior to and immediately after the conquest relied on a system of lordship, land
title and tenure that provided much of the economic basis for early English society. A
large part of the population made their livelihood as tenant farmers on land granted to
them by the aristocracy, which came with mutual expectations. The tenant owed tithes
and other stipulated services such as stewardship of an allotment of parish land as
well as allegiance to none but the king, whilst the lord ran a kind of protection racket,
guaranteeing  security  of  tenure  against  all  comers.76 This  bargain  has  much  in
common with a legal contract to the extent that it came with a number of stipulations
as to exactly what each party could expect of the other. One of the major benefits on
the tenant’s side was the right to pass land onto his descendants within a system of
coparcenary  entail,  meaning equal  partition  between surviving sons.77 While  there
73 McKendrick,  N.,  Brewer,  J.  &  Plumb,  J.  H.  The  Birth  of  a  Consumer  Society:  The
Commercialization of Eighteenth-Century England (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press,
1982) 
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75 Wood, E. M. The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View, (London: Verso, 2002)
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77 Baker, J.  An Introduction to English Legal History,  4th Edn, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
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were a few issues with these provisions, not least of which the problem of dividing up
plots of land already providing little more than bare subsistence, they did have one
distinct  advantage  within  early  Norman  social  order:  they  maintained  and  even
bolstered the nuclear family as a basic protective unit against the brutal violence that
permeated the Feudal world. 
With the introduction in the late thirteenth century of the twin laws of free alienation
and primogeniture,  the emphasis of the English common law began to shift  into a
slightly different, more individualistic frame. In the former case, the holders of title
gained the capacity to sell up or otherwise dispose of property without their heirs’
consent, such that children could be left penniless with no birth-right. If the parental
generation  failed  to  specify  where  their  property  would  go,  the  new  law  of
primogeniture  came  into  effect,  by  which  the  eldest  son  would  get  everything,
potentially leaving any siblings destitute. Yet, as Macfarlane78 puts it, “even the eldest
son had nothing except at the wish of his father or mother”. What this did was to
introduce  a  level  of unpredictability  into the transmission of  property  and wealth,
which  in  turn instigated  a  form of  social  mitosis,  or,  more figuratively,  a  ‘socio-
economic tumour’79 in which relatively well-heeled but by no means wealthy families
–  it  is  worth  noting  that  England  was  the  only  European  nation  not  to  limit
primogeniture to the aristocracy – started producing second and third siblings who
would have to work hard and independently to replicate the quality of their childhood
lifestyle. In other words, it created a process by which English society, based on a
peculiar  difference from the rest of Medieval and Early Modern Europe,  began to
spawn and  diffuse  outwards  new generations  of  anxious  proto-entrepreneurs  with
greater impetus toward commercial approaches to everyday life, which then began to
displace and subsume the ethical principles reproduced by the relatively short-lived
distributivist system.    
In this way we start to shed a little more light on the role of legal regulation and social
change in the long term trajectory of English and later, as trading arteries were once
again  pacified  and  opened  up,  mainland  European  societies  in  terms  of  the
minimisation  of interpersonal  violence and its  socio-historical  crossover  with non-
violent, abstract criminality. It is interesting to note that continental Europe, despite
78 Macfarlane, 1978: 83
79 see Hall, 2014
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its growing trade routes, the birth of the accounting system in Milan and the eventual
establishment of Amsterdam as the hub of sea trade, was overtaken by England in the
run-up  to  industrial  capitalism.  Running  alongside  the  standard  reasons  is  the
comparative failure of European territories to pacify their  trade routes and rapidly
diffuse the norm of sociosymbolic competition in place of physical violence. What’s
in  train  here  is  not,  as  Elias80 held,  a  ‘blind’,  ‘evolutionary’  drive  toward  social
refinement  and  interpersonal  empathy  but  the  result  of  dynamic  tension  between
pacification  and  stimulation,  between  socio-legal  systems  as  agencies  of  violence
reduction  and  incentives  toward  attitudes  and  dispositions  conducive  to  the
sociosymbolic competition that fuelled consumer demand in physically pacified but
sublimely  and  functionally  aggressive  marketplaces.81 If  we  look  again  at  our
narrative thus far we might suggest that, within a context of enhanced enforcement,
delegation  of  authority,  changing  circumstances  and  the  proliferation  of  an
increasingly  commercial  mentality  along  with  the  requisite  potential  for  abstract
‘criminality’,  we  seem  to  be  looking  at  the  beginnings  of  the  socio-economic
marginalisation and obsolescence of physically violent criminality.82 In Hall’s83 terms,
“as we became less violent and bloodthirsty we became richer and more pacified but
possibly  less  honourable  and…  less  egalitarian;  violence  looks  to  have  been
sublimated into symbolic and toned-down practical forms rather than dispersed into
the transcendental realm of spirituality”.  
Yet we can take this at least one step further. In light of the above, we might observe,
as does Hall,84 that there are two mutually opposed conditions in which our social
order cannot function.  With its  dual need for pacified trading networks as well as
producers,  merchants  and  consumers  less  likely  to  acquire  property  and  resolve
disputes with violence, it is immediately obvious that capitalism cannot function in
chaotic,  violent  conditions.  Equally,  however,  the  requirement  for  pacified
sociosymbolic  competition  also  means  that  it  cannot  develop  in  conditions  of
excessive  pacification  reproduced  by  institutionalized,  diffused  and  internalized
altruism. Thus we have to consider the proposition that the measured altruism bound
80 Elias, 1994 [1939]
81 see Hall, 2007; 2012
82 see Walsh, 1994
83 see Hall, 2012: 25
84 Hall, 2014
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by custom and law that helped to facilitate the growth of the medieval distributivist
economy became dysfunctional in an early market-capitalist economy that was more
dependent  on  extracting  surpluses  from  all  economic  transactions  and  diffusing
aggressive  but  non-violent  competitive  individualism  throughout  the  whole
sociosymbolic field. When it comes down to it, we might suggest that the function of
legal  systems,  alongside  social  and  cultural  change,  is  to  keep  social  order  and
subjectivity oscillating between these two poles, as if captured in a magnetic field 85 or
held in some sort of socio-cultural Lagrangian point. The regulatory regimes that have
grown  around  market  capitalism  open  up  a  third  space  between  these  extremes,
between pacified order and violent disorder – a space of what we might call ‘orderly
disorder’ – in which the fundamental objective is, contra Foucault,86 not to create a
‘disciplinary  society’,  or,  contra  Garland,87 a  ‘culture  of  control’  so  much  as  to
systematically facilitate and harness the tension between pacification and stimulation
that provided much of the dynamic force behind early capitalism’s proliferation of
trading  activity  and  the  development  of  the  pseudo-pacified  socio-economic
competition we now call ‘consumer culture’.
While we do not have the space for full consideration of appropriate examples, the
subsequent  development  of  the  English  legal  system  and  the  pseudo-pacification
process into the fifteenth through eighteenth centuries at least provides us with some
indication of what this concept of ‘orderly disorder’ actually means in the context of
systems  of  socio-economic  regulation.  It  is  often  remarked  just  how  brutal  and
censorious English socio-legal regulation – known as the ‘Bloody Code’ – became in
the  run-up to  the  industrial  revolution.  However,  it  had  both shape  and function.
Important and prominent statutes such as the Waltham Black Acts had a very clear
objective  and  focus,  which  ultimately  came  down,  as  Losurdo88 suggests,  to
“terroristic legislation in defence of property”. In his well-known commentary on the
relationship between property and eighteenth century criminal law, Hay89 notes that
85 see Hall, 2015
86 Foucault, 1991
87 Garland, D.  The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society ,  (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001)
88 Losurdo, D. Liberalism: A Counter-History, (London: Verso, 2011) 78
89 Hay,  D. ‘Property,  Authority and Criminal Law’ in  Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in
Eighteenth Century England, Rev. Edn., edited by Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh, John Rule, E. P.
Thompson & Cal Winslow, (London: Verso, 2011); see also Radzinowicz, L. ‘The Waltham Black
Acts: Study of the Legislative Attitude Towards Crime in the Eighteenth Century’, Cambridge Law
24
the number of capital statutes grew from around 50 in 1688 to well over 200 in 1820,
the vast majority of which were concerned with offences against property. Bourgeois
legal power overwhelmingly involved protecting their own property holdings whilst
expropriating and enclosing common land, ignoring traditional subsistence rights and
criminalising minor acts of appropriation to the extent that even lowly forms of theft
and property damage nominally attracted mandatory death sentences. Hay goes on,
however, to note that the sheer prevalence of the death sentence actually goes some
way to concealing the underlying function of criminal sanction. It is not a case of
anyone who committed property offences, upon sentencing, immediately finding their
way to the gallows – execution statistics, it seems, do not support such a simplistic
conclusion  –  but  instead  the  terror  of  a  vicious  penal  code  acting  to  theatrically
emphasize the mercy of patronage and pardon in order to legitimize the power of the
ruling class. 
This  punitive  and  severe  approach  to  ‘lower  class’  crimes  that  provided  most
lawbreakers  with  little  beyond  individual  subsistence  must  be  juxtaposed  with  a
relatively lax, almost disinterested evaluation of forms of aggressive and exploitative
practices still  seen by many as ‘deviant’  but of substantial  and systemic economic
value. Many of the questionable practices of early capitalism, for example, seem to
have attracted  little  in  the  way of  determined  censure,  with  growing tolerance  of
usury, price undercutting, short-weighting, low wages, misrepresentation of goods for
sale  and a host of petty  fiddles,  perks and pilferage,  not  to mention a  completely
unknown level of historical ‘white-collar’ criminality that attracted next to no censure.
In the case of but one example, which perhaps reveals a degree of historical continuity
in the decline of economically  inhibitive aggression,  Emsley90 points to a class of
economically  functional  deviance  that  was  pretty  much  expected  and  for  which
businesses made allowances. The transportation of coal by canal during the eighteenth
century allowed boatmen to sell some of the shipment on route and pocket any such
takings,  but  instead  of  trying  to  deal  with  the  problem miners  were  instructed  to
simply load more onto the boats than stated in the manifest, as if these offences were
part  of  the  ‘price  of  doing  business’.  In  even  more  forthright  terms,  Emsley91
continues: 
Journal 9 no. 1 (1945) 56-81
90 Emsley, C. Crime and Society in England: 1750-1900, 4th Edn, (London: Routledge, 2010)
91 ibid. 161
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In early nineteenth-century Wigan the law appears to be have been administered
humanely  and  impartially…  except  when  it  was  involved  with  industry.
Employers  were  rarely  prosecuted,  and  if  convicted  were  only  moderately
fined… on the other hand, heavy sentences were imposed even for first offences
of industrial theft. Workers, including children, were commonly prosecuted for
breach of contract in leaving work without proper notice. 
What we have here, we suggest, is slightly more complex than the usual analysis of
differential power relations in the official criminalisation process because, rather than
simply favouring the ruling elite, the prevailing approach to social regulation opens
up a third space between order and disorder in which any ambitious entrepreneur can
operate  and  prosper.  It  affords  market  capitalism  the  space  to  thrive  within  a
regulatory framework of sufficient pacification for its various trading activities to take
place relatively unmolested by taking a censorious, punitive approach to economically
deleterious criminality. Conversely, it should be noted, however, that this economic
system  would  also  struggle  to  function  within  an  overly  pacified  and  altruistic
context. Kant’s92 ‘race of devils’ was to be repressed by the collective reason of law,
but when Durkheim93 averred that a ‘society of saints’ would not last long, he was
probably right but for the wrong reasons. The violence and immorality, which in the
pre-modern era were performed as substantive practices in the service of order and
disorder were sublimated and acted out as symbolic interplay, thus establishing the
dynamic condition of pseudo-pacified ‘orderly disorder’.
The upshot is that, instead of a unipolar, monotone emphasis on social control, what
we see is a dynamic yet undialectical tension between the pacification of violent urges
and the stimulation of the libidinal forces of ambition, competition, envy and so on.94
It is ‘undialectical’ because neither aspect of the process, and therefore the process
itself,  changes  according to  any politically  relevant  recognition  of  its  own or  the
other’s contradictions; they simply remain in dynamic tension producing energy. This
arrangement is maintained by the abolition of the political discourses that can reveal
and inform action against these contradictions and the deleterious social effects of the
92 Kant, I. The Metaphysics of Morals, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
93 Durkheim, E. The Rules of the Sociological Method, (New York, NY: The Free 
Press, 1966)
94 see Hall, 2012; 2014
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overall process itself.95 Western legal systems, it seems, simultaneously stimulate and
repress  libidinal  energy  in  order  to  create  the  dynamic  force  –  pseudo-pacified
sociosymbolic  competition  within  the  confines  of  consumer  marketplaces  –  that
energizes  and drives economic  cycles.  However,  in  order to  maintain  such cycles
Western  legal  systems  on  balance  tend  to  lean  more  towards  stimulation  than
repression,  resulting  in  deviant  activity  inevitably  spilling  over  its  repressive
boundaries. Indeed, in partnership with a measured amount of punitiveness, acted out
predominantly in the symbolic realm, comes a far more open, discretionary take on
forms of pacified low-level deviance that enable continued economic vitality. Thus
European ethico-legal structures can create a regulatory ‘third space’ in which certain
forms of deviance not only thrive but are integral to the continued viability of the
prevailing economic system. 
4. Conclusion
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  explore  the  origins  of  early  market  economies,
particularly in  England,  in relation to  the remarkable,  progressive minimisation of
interpersonal violence after the fourteenth century, and to put forward the claim that it
was not so much ‘spiritualized’96 or eliminated from everyday life as repressed and
sublimated to perform vital functions in the engine-room of the market system. We
began with an analysis  of the socio-historical  context  after  the fall  of the Roman
Empire in order to explore what appears to have been an extraordinary decline in
cultural vibrancy, economic production and social sophistication. The vacuum left in
the wake of Roman power seems not to have been filled by any comparable power
base  for  a  number  of  centuries,  to  the  extent  that  English  life,  with  comparable
conditions across other parts of northern Europe, seems to have descended into a kind
of violent free-for-all reminiscent of, if not actually reflected in Hobbes’s concept of
an anarchic ‘state of nature’. When power did successfully coalesce under a relatively
central authority, it was that of the Norman invaders after 1066, who, initially at least,
seem to have been notably unsuccessful in their attempts to govern large swaths of the
country, which ultimately gave rise to a feudal social order simultaneously plagued by
and built upon predatory exploitation and interpersonal violence. 
95 see Hall, 2012; Winlow & Hall, 2013
96 see Spierenburg, 2008
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The traditional explanation of why serious physical violence in English society started
to decline after the reign of Edward I has drawn much from the work of Norbert Elias,
specifically his concept of a ‘civilizing process’. In this standard formulation, growing
centralisation  of  power  allowed  for  the  greater  political  complexities  and  social
interdependence  that  eventually  took  on  a  life  of  their  own  as  they  began  to
reconfigure  the  emotional  dispositions  of  the  general  population.  Furthermore,  he
argues,  the emergence  of physically  non-violent  sensibilities  betrays a naturalistic,
evolutionary  drive  toward  pacified  sociality,  indicating  an  irreducible  relationship
between complexity and pacification. Unfortunately, Elias’s thesis comes laden with a
number of problems, not least of which is his tendency to gloss over the relationship
between  internal  and external  worlds,  particularly  in  light  of  the  observation  that
crime seems not to have ‘civilized’ so much as changed with the times and developed
into a more modernist form with a greater propensity for property offences. What this
empirical  tipping point  allows us to  do,  however,  is  to  begin moving beyond the
problematic  bounds  of  Elias’s  thesis  to  consider  the  possibility  of  a  rather  more
dualistic  and  dynamic  analytical  model  of  the  relationship  between  contemporary
political  economy  and  the  diffusion  of  ‘pseudo-pacified’  social  interaction  and
cultural-subjective sensibilities. It is, in short, difficult to say that violence was fully
pacified  because  following  sublimation  it  seems  to  have  re-emerged  not  just  in
organized military forms but also more subtly in aggressive rule-bound sociosymbolic
competition  that  often  provided  the  motivations  for  more  abstract  forms  of
criminality. 
In light of these problems a number of contemporary theorists have begun to move
away from Elias’s work toward locating pacification firmly within the unstable yet
dynamic context of market economies in a tense undialectical relationship between
social and individual subjectivity. What seems to have happened is that attempts to
repair England’s social order after the manifold depredations of the Dark and early
Middle  Ages  relied  on  a  certain  amount  of  distributivism  captured,  as  much  as
anything, by the delegation of social responsibility for civic peace and moves toward
a slightly more equitable distribution of wealth in order to stem the tide of brutality.
While these measures probably were not anywhere near as successful as might have
been  hoped,  and  were  no  doubt  plagued  by  all  manner  of  double-dealing,  they
succeeded in evacuating enough violence from everyday life to facilitate a moderate
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upturn in trading activity, which, alongside other significant legal changes, started to
erode  the  ethical  codes  and  dispositions  associated  with  distributivism.  In  other
words,  prevailing  legal  systems,  as  they  solicited  the  population  into  more
entrepreneurial  dispositions,  encouraged  the  further  sublimation  of  violence  into
pseudo-pacified sociosymbolic competition within growing consumer marketplaces.
What  this  means,  however,  is  that  the  long term decline  in  violence  between the
fifteenth and twentieth centuries is less of an evolutionary drive than a secondary and
rather fragile and dependent product of economic functions and relations operating
within modernist regulatory frameworks.   
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